The authors acknowledge the political resistance to privatization, and suggest that one way to build support would be to demonstrate the effects by designing experiments to provide evidence of how the change might affect carriers and passengers. In what may be the first major experiment in the United States, Chicago Midway was leased for $2.5 billion in 2008 to a consortium lead by YVR Airport Services Ltd., an affiliate of the Vancouver Airport Authority, Citi Infrastructure Investors and John Hancock Life Insurance Co.
Gillen and Niemeier describe the shift to more market-oriented policies in ownership and management of airport infrastructure within the European Union (EU). The change, they say, reflects a position that airports can improve their efficiency and service to passengers and carriers under privatization. They trace the source of the change to a 1995 European Commission statement that infrastructure should be priced according to social marginal cost principles.
The authors provide a useful overview of different airport regulation models. Control over airport charges (i.e., charges for services like runways, gates, and apron use) varies extensively. Both cost-based and price-cap regulation schemes are discussed, as well as their major drawbacks. Cost-based regulations, for example, fail to provide the proper signals for pricing, since they provide no incentive for airports to minimize costs. Price-cap regulations are criticized for their short-term focus and lack of incentives to invest.
Gillen and Niemeier also include a discussion of EU approaches to capacity constraints. Many EU airports experience significantly more demand than capacity, and airport expansion is hindered by financial and political/environmental constraints. As a result, the EU rations capacity through a slot allocation process. The authors describe the features of this process, including how slots are obtained, grandfathering clauses, how new entrants are addressed, slot sales and trading, and hoarding.
Looking across the various approaches applied by EU member states, Gillen and Niemeier conclude that systems with independent regulators, incentive-based regulation, and dual tills have incentives to reduce X-inefficiency. There are incentives for price differentiation to increase traffic and to manage demand. 1 Peter Forsyth describes airport regulatory policy and performance in Australia and New Zealand (A/NZ). These examples stand in contrast to the discussion of events in the EU, as demand for operations at A/NZ airports tends to be far less than existing capacity, and thus raises questions about how to recover costs.
Forsyth highlights the question of what goals the governments sought to advance through their regulatory approaches. He argues that in A/NZ, the overall "light-handed" regulatory approach is oriented more toward keeping prices near costs than promoting efficiency. "Light-handed regulation is about process, not content -it is possible to have light-handed, cost-plus regulation."
The author provides a useful summary of efficiencies that must be considered with airports, in particular productive efficiency, allocative efficiency, ensuring that investment is neither inadequate nor excessive, and taking advantage of opportunities for commercial development. He extends that discussion into the "airport cost recovery problem," and relates it to pricing and single-till vs. dualtill charging mechanisms. 2 The major shortcoming with the regulatory environment concerns investment incentives. Many airports are under pressure from local or regional interests to make "excessive investments," and those costs are passed on ultimately to passengers under cost-plus regulation. Forsyth thus considers the lack of incentives to get investment right to be the "least satisfactory aspect of current regulatory frameworks." If the regulatory approaches of both A/NZ could be revised, the author concludes that some disincentives for excessive investment need to be adopted.
Anne Graham provides a thorough overview of airport planning and regulation in the U.K. She highlights the changes in airport ownership and the government's regulation of airports following the Thatcher government's decisions to corporatize and privatize nationalized industries, such as utilities, communications, and transportation.
Under the 1986 Airports Act, the government stated its policy that air transport should not be subsidized by the taxpayer and that airports should operate as commercial undertakings. The Act also allowed for the British Airports Authority (BAA) to become a private company -one eventually bought by the Spanish firm Ferrovial -and authorized the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to exercise economic regulation over airports.
Graham provides an overview of the price cap regulation (RPI +/-X) that the CAA applies to airports and the effect of its use of single-till charging. 2 She discusses major policy issues associated with the U.K.'s regulatory approach, focusing on the length of the planning process (the public inquiry into Heathrow's Terminal 5 lasted for 30 months and cost an estimated £80 million) and the effects of price-cap regulation on airport efficiency. Graham notes that for congested airports (the London airports in particular), prices that emanate from single-till charging schemes are inefficient, in that they do not reflect the economic value of using the airports. She also discusses the effect of RPI+/-X price caps' inevitable focus on short-term operational efficiencies at the expense of investment incentives.
Tretheway and Andriulaitis 3 review the evolution of Canadian airport investment policy. Canadian airports were operated under a federal department that gradually found itself unable to finance needed capacity expansion. Facing looming budgetary pressures, the national government decided to "quasi-privatize" the airports by transferring them to local airport authorities that were established as non-profit entities. The authors trace the evolution of the airports' governance models and some of the major issues with devolving the airports, such as inequities between the airports in terms of rents paid back to the national government.
The authors discuss how the not-for-profit governance model -coupled with a policy goal of facilitating investment in airport infrastructure -proved to be inherently paradoxical. The government believed that the not-for-profit model would help ensure that airport prices and charges would remain reasonable. Because the airports lacked initial equity when quasi-privatized, their only ability to generate revenue needed for investment was gained by charging prices that allowed for an accumulation of net income (profits).
Tretheway and Andriulaitis pointed out that governments wishing to use a non-profit governance model in sectors requiring large capital investments should appreciate the implications that those actions may have for the need for pricing freedom and the possible intergenerational transfer of wealth.
The final two chapters discuss other parts of the globe with significantly different airport situations. Anming Zhang and Andrew Yuen's chapter describes airport policy and performance in mainland China and Hong Kong. Before the 1980s, virtually every aspect of aviation in China was under the control of the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), which was a department of the air force. This included not just the regulator, but also air traffic control, airport management, and airline operations. Zhang and Yuen discuss how aviation there was gradually liberalized, and what the effects have been on productivity, passenger growth, competition, and safety. They note, however, that because the state retains a controlling stake in key airports, efficiency remains a challenge.
Hong Kong International is obviously in a different situation than other Chinese airports; the discussion of HKIA centers more on the competition it increasingly faces from Guangzhou and Shenzhen for local traffic and other Asian airports, such as Singapore, Tokyo, and Seoul for connecting traffic.
Kenneth Button lastly provides a discussion of air transportation infrastructure in developing countries. He focuses largely on Africa and South America, and notes that they too are moving to liberalize the institutional environments in which air transport infrastructure services are delivered. Button's discussion highlights what little analysis has been published on these area's aviation systems, which makes it difficult to generalize or draw conclusions. The focus on many of these locations remains not on niceties of economic efficiency, but on the need to meet minimum standards of service, safety, and security.
